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Brain Development, Social Context and Justice Policy 
Elizabeth Scott
*
, Natasha Duell
**
, and Laurence Steinberg
***
 
 
 Justice policy reform in the past decade has been driven by powerful research evidence 
indicating that brain development is ongoing through adolescence, and that neurological and 
psychological immaturity likely contributes in important ways to teenagers’ involvement in 
crime. Courts (including the Supreme Court
1
), legislatures and agencies increasingly view 
juvenile offenders as different from their adult counterparts, and accept that the legal response to 
juvenile crime should attend to these differences. An emerging consensus holds that the criminal 
law goals of fairness, accountability and crime prevention are advanced by policies that deal less 
punitively with most juveniles than with adults and that sanction juveniles in developmentally 
appropriate ways.
2
 
Although lawmakers and the public increasingly accept the argument for 
developmentally-based justice policies, some skepticism remains. A typical response by those 
unpersuaded that developmental science has powerful legal and policy relevance is to point out 
that many (perhaps most) adolescents do not engage in serious criminal activity; thus, normative 
biological and psychological factors associated with adolescence are unlikely to play the 
important role in juvenile offending that is posited by those supporting the reform trend.
3
 Not 
surprisingly, these skeptics are inclined to discount the relevance of adolescent immaturity to 
justice policy.
4
  
                                                 
*
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1
 The Supreme Court in a series of Eighth Amendment opinions has struck down harsh sentences for juvenile 
offenders. See  Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida 560 U.S. ___ (2010);  Miller v. Alabama 
567 U.S. ___ (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ____(2016). 
2
 See discussion in Elizabeth Scott, Thomas Grisso, Marsha Levick, & Laurence Steinberg, Juvenile Sentencing 
Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 675 (2016). 
3
 Gideon Yaffe, The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility (2018). See also, 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 112 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Miller, 567 U.S. at 513 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. 
at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
4
 Critics, such as Justice Scalia  have noted that advocates view adolescents as mature for purposes of making 
abortion decisions. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting ).  
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To be sure, not all adolescents commit crimes - and, certainly, very few commit serious 
offenses.
5
  As the skeptics’ challenge suggests, the argument for developmentally-based justice 
policies is oversimplified if it is taken to mean that features associated with biological and 
psychological immaturity alone lead teenagers to engage in illegal conduct. The decision to 
offend, like much behavior in adolescence, is the product of dynamic interaction between the 
still-maturing individual and her social context. In this essay, we analyze this intricate 
relationship and clarify how social environment influences adolescent choices in ways that 
incline or deter involvement in crime and in other risky behavior.  
The claim that social context influences teenage criminal behavior is familiar,
6
 and 
relatively uncontroversial.  What has not received much attention is the relationship between 
biology (and psychology) and environment, and the mechanisms through which particular 
tendencies and traits associated with adolescent brain development interact with environmental 
influences to encourage antisocial or prosocial behavior. Brain development in adolescence is 
associated with reward-seeking behavior and limited future orientation.
7
 It is also associated with 
increased sensitivity to external stimuli, and particularly with heightened susceptibility to peer 
influence, which in turn contributes to emotional arousal and impulsivity
8
. In short, social 
environment can play a powerful role in inclining teenagers toward risk-taking (and generally in 
shaping adolescent behavior), because, compared to adults, adolescents are particularly 
responsive to external stimuli (particularly peers), easily aroused emotionally, and less able to 
regulate strong emotions. Because they are easily aroused, adolescents are also more sensitive to 
threats than are adults.
9
  These external influences can override the adolescent’s still developing 
ability to make reasoned decisions.  
 These tendencies associated with adolescent brain development may be manifested in 
different teenagers in different ways; heightened tendencies toward risk-taking may impel 
                                                 
5
  Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund. Law Enforcement and Juvenile Crime, in JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND 
VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT at 125 (2006). 
 
6
 See Roper, 545 U.S. at 569; Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (recognizing importance of peer influence on offending).  
7
 Adolescents tend to focus on short-term, and to discount long term, consequences of choices and behavior, 
particularly under conditions of emotional or social arousal.   
8
 See discussion, t.a.n _ to _ infra.  
9
 See Alexandra O. Cohen, Kaitlyn Breiner, Laurence Steinberg, Richard J. Bonnie, Elizabeth S. Scott, Kim Taylor-
Thompson, Marc D. Rudolph, Jason Chein, Jennifer A. Richeson, Aaron S. Heller, Melanie R. Silver, Danielle V. 
Dellarco, Damien A. Fair, Adriana Galván, and B.J. Casey, When is an Adolescent an Adult? Assessing Cognitive 
Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts 27 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 549, 549-62 (2016) 
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antisocial acts in some teens, but more aggressive play on the athletic field in others.
10
 
Depending on the nature of the social environment, these biologically-driven inclinations can be 
activated “in the moment” to contribute to risky behavior, including fast driving, excessive 
drinking, unsafe sex and criminal activity.  In this article, we examine the interaction between 
developmental tendencies and contextual influences that promote or deter risk-taking and 
criminal involvement. 
The endogenous factors that contribute to risky behavior are normative in adolescence; 
although studies find substantial variations in individual propensities, adolescents, on average, 
exhibit these tendencies and engage in risk-taking to a greater extent than do adults. Indeed, the 
combination of reward-seeking, impulsivity, easily aroused emotions, and susceptibility to peer 
influence leads a large percentage of teens to occasionally behave in ways that could be the basis 
of criminal charges.
11
 But a teenager who lives in a high-crime neighborhood with many 
antisocial peers is more likely to get involved in criminal activity than one in a neighborhood 
with few such peers, even though the two may not differ in their tendencies and propensities for 
risk-taking.
12
 Developmental tendencies might lead the first youth to engage in criminal activity, 
something he would likely not consider on his own. If instead, his peers were into car racing, or 
if drugs were readily available and popular in the neighborhood, risk-taking behavior might take 
these forms. And if he were a member of a close-knit and highly competitive basketball team, the 
interaction of peer influence and reward-seeking might lead to the sort of risk-taking on the 
basketball court that is socially accepted.  
Scientific knowledge about the interaction between the developing adolescent and his or 
her social context is also important in designing correctional facilities and structuring programs 
for juveniles. For juveniles in the justice system, the correctional facility or program constitutes 
the social environment for development during the period of the sanction, and the correctional 
setting can have either a positive or negative impact on the young offender’s future life. The 
adolescent brain is more malleable, or “plastic,” than that of adults,13 and because of increased 
                                                 
10
 See Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Involving Adolescents’ 
Criminal Culpability 14 NATURE REV. NEUROSCI. 513, 513-18 (2013) 
11
  See Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk Taking 28 DEV. REV. 78, 78-106 
(2008). 
12
 See t.a.n _ to _ infra. 
13
 See LAURENCE STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF ADOLESCENCE at 18 (2014)  
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plasticity, teenagers are particularly responsive to environmental stimuli, both positive and 
negative; during this formative developmental stage,
14
 those environmental influences can shape 
the trajectory of individuals’ lives. Psychologists explain that healthy maturation during 
adolescence is an extended and interactive process between the individual and her social context, 
in which opportunities in the social environment facilitate or impede accomplishment of 
developmental tasks necessary to effective adult functioning.
15
 A justice policy that aims to 
reduce recidivism and maximize the potential for juvenile offenders’ transition to non-criminal 
adulthood recognizes the importance of social context by structuring programs and facilities to 
promote positive development during this formative stage. 
Our inquiry into the dynamic interaction between brain development in adolescence and 
social context offers powerful support for policies that subject adolescent offenders to more 
lenient sanctions than adults receive and that tailor dispositions to juveniles’ developmental 
needs. Our examination confirms and illuminates the Supreme Court’s conclusion that juveniles 
deserve less punishment than adult offenders because their offenses are driven by biological and 
psychological immaturity, and also because, as legal minors, juveniles cannot extricate 
themselves from social contexts (neighborhoods, schools and families) that contribute- to 
involvement in crime.
16
  Our interactive model also confirms that correctional facilities and 
programs are social settings that can support healthy development to adulthood in individual 
offenders, but can also affect young offenders’ lives in harmful ways. Thus our analysis provides 
a sound empirical and theoretical foundation for developmentally-based justice policies that have 
emerged over the past decade. Our analysis also informs a long-standing debate of whether an 
offender’s deprived social environment mitigates criminal responsibility. Proponents argue that 
mitigation applies to defendants who have experienced severe deprivation on the ground that 
their impoverished environment undermined their ability to act as law abiding citizens.
17
 This 
                                                 
14
 See discussion t.a.n. infra.  
15
 Steinberg, note 13 at 11. 
16
,Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009 (2003); 
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg Blaming Youth, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 799 (2003). The Supreme Court adopted 
this position in its 8
th
 Amendment opinions. Roper, 545 U.S. at 569; Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; Montgomery, 136 S. 
Ct. 718, at 733.   
17
 See David Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976). Judge Bazelon first 
developed the argument in Alexander v. United States, 471 F. 2d. 923, 957-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973).  The argument was 
developed more fully by Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background': Should the Criminal Law Recognize a 
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?,” 3 LAW & INEQ. J. 9 (1985). See also Richard Delgado, The 
Wretched of the Earth, 2 Ala. Civ. Rts & Civ. Lib. L. Rev 1 (2011); Andrew Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law: 
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argument has been largely dismissed as undermining free will and as diluting responsibility for a 
broad range of offenders.
18
 Our analysis narrows and sharpens the claim that social context is 
relevant to the punishment of juveniles on both retributivist and consequentialist grounds.  
A brief roadmap of the article may be helpful. In Part I, we review the research evidence 
describing biological and psychological features of adolescent brain development that are 
relevant to risk-taking and offending. This research offers powerful support for the legal 
judgment that juveniles’ criminal choices often are influenced by factors associated with 
normative development. Part I concludes with a description of recent cross-cultural research 
indicating that these attributes inhere in adolescence as a developmental stage and are not solely 
the product of particular social contexts.
19
  
Part II analyzes how the traits described in Part I can influence behavior in a variety of 
ways depending on social context, resulting in neutral, anti-social, or prosocial outcomes.  As we 
explain, environmental factors can minimize or intensify the extent to which emotional factors 
contribute to risk-taking behavior—and the kinds of risky behavior chosen.  Most important is 
the influence of peer group (constituted of other reward-seeking and impulsive adolescents). Part 
II then focuses directly on criminal involvement; the interaction between social context and 
normative biological and psychological factors in the still maturing individual can influence the 
teen's involvement in an antisocial peer group and in criminal activity. And in most teens, this 
interaction abates as the adolescent matures, leading to desistence.  Part II describes briefly a 
category of young offenders less likely than normative adolescents to desist from antisocial 
activity with maturity because their offending is driven by various dispositional and 
environmental factors, many of which predated adolescence, and not primarily by the interaction 
of developmental factors and social context.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Why Courts and Legislatures Ignore Richard Delgado’s Rotten Social Background Defense, 2 Ala. Civ. Rts & Civ. 
Lib. L. Rev 79 (2011); Michele Estrin Gilman, The Poverty Defense, 47 U. Rich. L. Rev. 495, 501–02 (2013); Stuart 
P. Green, Hard Times, Hard Time: Retributive Justice for Unjustly Disadvantaged Offenders, 2010 U. Chi. Legal F. 
43, 47-48, 59-69 (2010).   
18
 Stephan Morse has offered the most sophisticated rebuttal of deprivation as a defense. See Stephen Morse, 
Deprivation and Desert, in From Social Justice to Criminal Justice: Poverty and the Administration of the Criminal 
Law 114 (William Heffernan & John Kleinig, eds, 2000); Severe Environmental Deprivation: A Tragedy, Not a 
Defense, 2 Ala. Civ. Rts & Civ. Lib. L. rev 147 (2011).  See also Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 Cal. L. 
Rev. 257, 284-85 (1987). 
19
 See t.a.n _ to _ infra. Laurence Steinberg et al., Around the World, Adolescence is a Time of Heightened Sensation 
Seeking and Immature Self-Regulation, e12532 DEV. SCI. 1, 1-13 (2017).ND—Correct cite?  
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Part IIII explains how the social environment provided by the justice system’s sanctions 
can impede or enhance healthy brain development, because the facilities and programs through 
which law responds to juvenile crime create the social context for the developing young 
offender. Evidence of brain malleability supports that social context can influence development 
in a positive or negative direction, and other research points to elements of that context that can 
facilitate healthy maturation.  
 Part IV analyzes the implications for law and policy of the interactive model of juvenile 
offending.  The analysis provides powerful support constitutional and legal trends that have 
emerged in the past decade based on the premise that juveniles are different from adult offenders 
and that the justice system should recognize these differences. Our analysis confirms 
conventional wisdom that immature brain development influences offending, but also explains 
how the teen’s interaction with his or her social context plays an important role. We also clarify 
how correctional programs can facilitate or undermine healthy development in adolescence, and  
highlight the importance of social context as a key element in policies that aim to prevent crime 
and promote desistence in young offenders.  
I. Psychological and Biological Immaturity 
In this Part, we describe the features of psychological and neurobiological development in 
adolescence that form the foundation of our interactional model of teenage risk-taking behavior. 
This growing body of developmental research provides powerful support for the constitutional 
principle that “children are different,”20 and for the growing trend toward acknowledging these 
differences in the legal response to juvenile crime. The research also clarifies that the 
developmental tendencies that contribute to involvement in crime also incline adolescents toward 
risk–taking generally, and that offending is a part of a larger picture.   
 Adolescent risk-taking can be understood, in part, as arising from a “maturity gap” 
between cognitive and psychosocial development. It is well understood that emotional and social 
maturation lags behind intellectual development and that adolescents’ capacity for self-regulation 
is immature.  As compared to adults, adolescents are particularly inclined toward reward-seeking 
and are extremely sensitive to their social context and particularly to peers. This combination of 
                                                 
20
 See Miller v Alabama 567 U.S. ___ (2012); 
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features contribute to emotional arousal.
21
 And when teenagers are emotionally aroused, they 
tend to make impulsive, short-sighted choices and engage in risky behavior that they might 
understand are ill-advised when considered in a neutral setting. This Part then describes a “dual 
systems” model of brain development offered by developmentalists to explain this tendency 
toward impulsive risky choices:  While brain systems implicated in reward seeking and 
sensitivity to peers develop early in adolescence around puberty, brain systems that govern self-
regulation mature gradually through adolescence and into early adulthood.
22
 Finally, this Part 
explains that these attributes and tendencies are endogenous to the developmental stage of 
adolescence and are found in teenagers across cultures. 
A. Developmental Factors Contributing to Risk-Taking.  
This section describes three features of adolescence that likely contribute to adolescents’ 
inclination to engage in risky behavior to a greater extent than adults. Both biological and 
behavioral research confirms that, as compared to adults, adolescents are more inclined toward 
reward-seeking, more sensitive to social context, and more impulsive in their choices, 
especially under conditions of emotional arousal. Each of these tendencies is linked to 
normative brain development.  
 
1. Reward Seeking.  
Substantial research evidence supports that adolescents are sensitive to rewards and 
inclined toward reward- or sensation seeking to a greater extent than adults, and that they focus 
on rewards rather than risks in making choices. As discussed below, this inclination is normative 
in adolescence; indeed, increased sensation seeking is adaptive developmentally as it encourages 
adolescents to explore their environment and to develop a sense of identity and autonomy.
23
  But 
reward-seeking interacts with teenagers’ sensitivity to peers in ways that can contribute to 
harmful risk-taking.  
During early adolescence, regions of the brain associated with “incentive processing,” or the 
valuation and prediction of rewards, undergo substantial changes resulting in heightened reward 
                                                 
21
 See Sarah-Jane Blakemore & Kathryn L. Mills, Is Adolescence a Sensitive Period for Sociocultural Processing? 
65 ANNUAL. REV. PSYCHOL. 187, 187-207 (2014). 
22
 See discussion _ to _ infra.  
23
 See Eveline A. Crone & Ronald E. Dahl, Understanding Adolescence as a Period of Social-Affective Engagement 
and Goal Flexibility 13 NATURE REV. NEUROSCI. 636, 636-50 (2012); Bruce J. Ellis et al., The Evolutionary Basis of 
Adolescent Behavior: Implications for Science, Policy, and Practice 48 DEV. PSYCH. 598, 598-623 (2012). 
8 
 
sensitivity during this period.
24
 These changes have been linked to hormonal developments 
during puberty that increase the number of dopamine receptors in the brain that are implicated in 
approach behaviors and the experience of pleasure.
25
 As a result, adolescents evince increased 
dopamine cell firing in response to rewarding stimuli,
26
 which affects feedback learning, 
sensitivity to social evaluation and loss, and incentive-driven responses.
27
  
Neurodevelopmental studies of risk behavior generally suggest that heightened risk taking in 
adolescence is associated with greater activation of reward-sensitive brain regions among 
adolescents as compared to adults.
28
  In brain imaging studies, when presented with images of 
rewarding stimuli, such as smiling faces, adolescents evince a stronger response in reward-
processing regions than do children or adults. Moreover, the extent to which individuals show 
this sensitivity to reward is correlated with risk taking.
29
 This suggests that risk taking is, to some 
extent, intrinsically rewarding to adolescents, or that adolescents are more sensitive to the 
potential rewards associated with risks.  
A large body of behavioral research confirms that adolescents are more sensitive to 
rewards and more inclined toward reward-seeking than are adults; these findings are consistent 
with the neurobiological evidence. In these studies, reward seeking is typically measured using 
self-report scales that assess characteristics such as thrill- or novelty- seeking, or behavioral tasks 
that assess responsiveness to rewarding stimuli (such as monetary rewards). For example, some 
studies use gambling tasks in which individuals must learn to discriminate between gambles that 
are likely to be rewarding (e.g., drawing cards from a deck that is likely to pay off) and those that 
are likely to be costly (e.g., drawing cards from decks that are likely to lead to losses).
30
 Others 
have used “temporal discounting” tasks, in which players are asked to choose between smaller, 
                                                 
24
 See Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing Activity in the Brain’s Reward 
Circuitry 14 DEV. SCI. F1, F1-F10 (2011).  
25
 See Dustin Wahlstrom, Paul Collins, Tonya White, & Monica Luciana, Developmental Changes in Dopamine 
Neurotransmission in Adolescence: Behavioral Implications and Issues in Assessment 72 BRAIN COGNITION. 146, 
146-59 (2010). 
26
 See Aarthi Padmanabhan & Beatriz Luna, Developmental Imaging Genetics: Linking Dopamine Function to 
Adolescent Behavior 89 BRAIN COGN. 27, 27-38 (2014). 
27
 See Wahlstrom, supra note 25. 
28
 See Adriana Galvan, Todd Hare, Henning Voss, Gary Glover, & B.J. Casey, Risk-Taking and the Adolescent 
Brain: Who is at Risk? 10 DEV. SCI. F8, F8-F14 (2007). 
29
 Dustin Albert & Lawrence Steinberg, Judgment and decision making in adolescence, 21 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 
211, 217-218 (2011). 
30
 See Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Age Differences in Affective Decision Making as Indexed by Performance on the 
Iowa Gambling Task 46 DEV. PSYCHOL. 193, 193-207 (2010). 
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immediate rewards (e.g., $200 today) versus larger, but delayed ones (e.g., $1,000 in six 
months).
31
  
Both self-report
32
 and behavioral
33
 studies of reward seeking indicate that this behavior 
peaks in mid-adolescence, and subsequently declines in adulthood. Cross-sectional studies of 
performance on gambling tasks demonstrate that mid- to late adolescents learn from rewards at a 
faster rate than do their younger peers or adults, and that the tendency to learn more quickly from 
rewarding experiences than from costly ones is substantially stronger among teens than among 
adults, who tend to learn from rewarding and costly experiences at similar rates.
34
  Studies of 
temporal discounting have found that younger adolescents demonstrate a stronger preference for 
smaller, immediate rewards, whereas older adolescents and adults are willing to wait longer for 
larger ones. Young adolescents also have been shown to characterize themselves in self-report 
surveys as being less future oriented (i.e., regulating behavior in favor of long-term goals) and 
less inclined to consider future consequences of one’s actions.35 Thus, middle adolescents (ages 
15 through 17) demonstrate a heightened sensitivity to rewards compared to younger or older 
individuals, and this sensitivity seems to motivate decision-making that is oriented toward the 
present rather than the future, even if the future-oriented decision is superior.  
2. Sensitivity to Social Environment.  
Adolescence is a period of heightened sensitivity to the social environment and the 
individual’s relationship to that context.  Recent research indicates that a network of brain 
systems governing thinking about social relationships undergoes significant changes in 
adolescence in ways that increase individuals’ concern about the opinion of other people, 
particularly peers.
36
 These brain regions, sometimes collectively referred to as “the social brain,” 
are more easily activated in adolescence than before or after, making teenagers especially attuned 
                                                 
31
 See Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 
28-44 (2009). 
32
 See Anahi Collado, Julia W. Felton, Laura MacPherson, & C.W. Lejuez, Longitudinal Trajectories of Sensation 
Seeking, Risk Taking Propensity, and Impulsivity Across Early to Middle Adolescence 39 ADDICT. BEHAVE. 1580, 
1580-88 (2014). 
33
 See Dana G. Smith, Lin Xiao, & Antoine Bechara, Decision Making in Children and Adolescents: Impaired Iowa 
Gambling Task Performance in Early Adolescence 48 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1180, 1180-87 (2012). 
34
 See Cauffman, supra note 30. 
35
 See Steinberg, supra note 31. 
36
 See Sarah-Jane Blakemore, Development of the Social Brain in Adolescence 105 J. R. SOC. MED. 111, 111-16 
(2012); Sarah-Jane Blakemore, & Kathryn Mills, Is Adolescence a Sensitive Period for Socio-cultural Processing? 
65 ANNUAL. REV. PSYCHOL. 187, 187-207 (2014).  
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to both positive and negative emotions of those around them.
37
 During this developmental 
period, individuals are more sensitive to both praise and rejection than are either children or 
adults, making them potentially more susceptible to peer influence, and responsive to threat.
38
   
Recent evidence sheds light on the relationship between peer sensitivity and reward seeking in 
adolescence, with important implications for adolescent risk taking.  Jason Chein and colleagues 
have examined the impact of the presence of peers on individuals’ neural responses to a potential 
reward, comparing adolescents between ages 14 to 18, with younger (19 to 22) and older (24 to 
29) adults making decisions in a simulated driving task. The study found that observation by 
peers increased activation in reward-related brain regions in adolescents, but not in the adults, 
and that activity in these regions predicted risk-taking (running a stoplight to complete the task 
faster) in the tasks.
39
   
Much behavioral research confirms adolescents’ sensitivity to peers, and finds a correlation 
between peer influence and risk-taking in adolescence. Social scientists have studied age 
differences in responses to peer influence by presenting individuals with hypothetical dilemmas 
involving peer influence. Studies presenting participants with situations involving pressure to 
engage in antisocial conduct have found that peer influence increases between childhood and 
mid-adolescence and declines slowly during the late adolescent years.
40
 Peer influence can 
operate directly when teenagers’ respond to peer pressure; but desire for peer approval and fear 
of rejection also affect adolescents’ choices more than those of adults.41 The increased salience 
of peers likely makes their approval especially important in group situations; it is not surprising, 
perhaps, that juveniles are far more likely to offend in groups than are adults.
42
 
                                                 
37
 Blakemore, id.  
38
 See Amanda E. Guyer, Erin B. McClure-Tone, Nina D. Shiffrin, Daniel S. Pine, & Eric E. Nelson, Probing the 
Neural Correlates of Anticipated Peer Evaluation in Adolescence 80 CHILD DEV. 1000, 1000-15 (2009); Michael 
Dreyfuss et al., Teens Impulsively React Rather than Retreat from Threat 36 DEV. NEUROSCI. 220, 220-27 (2014). 
39
 See Chein, supra note 24 on 7. Risk taking involved running stoplights, risking a crash.   
40
 This pattern has been long established. See Thomas J. Berndt, Developmental Changes in conformity to Peers and 
Parents, 15 DEV. PSYCHOL. 608, 608-616 (1979); Kathryn C. Monahan, Laurence Steinberg, & Elizabeth Cauffman, 
Affiliation with Antisocial Peers, Susceptibility to Peer Influence, and Desistance from Antisocial Behavior During 
the Transition to Adulthood 45 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1520, 1520-30 (2009) 
41
 See Guyer, supra note 38 on 9. 
42
 See Franklin E. Zimring & Hannah Laqueur, Kids, Groups, and Crime: In Defense of Conventional Wisdom 52 J. 
RES. CRIME DELINQ. 403, 403-413 (2015). 
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It is well established that adolescents take more risks in the presence of peers than when they 
are alone or with an adult,
43
 and that this “peer effect” is not found among adults.44 The presence 
of peers also influences risk preference among adolescents; adolescents (but not adults) are more 
likely to endorse the benefits of risky activities relative to costs in the presence of peers than 
when they are alone.
45
  One study has found that the presence of peers increases risk-taking 
among adolescents even when they are given information about the probability of positive and 
negative outcomes.
46
   
3 Impulsivity and Cognitive Control   
 When adolescents are emotionally aroused by the anticipation of rewards in the presence of 
peers, they tend to make riskier choices that they are less able to control than do adults.  As 
described in Section B below, deficits in self-control in adolescence are thought to derive from 
immaturity in the system of cognitive regulation centered in the prefrontal cortex and its 
connections to social and emotional brain regions. This system develops slowly during 
adolescence and is not fully mature until the early to mid- twenties. In adolescence, it can be 
overwhelmed by emotional and social responses, contributing to short-sighted choices. 
47
   
Studies measure self-regulation using both self-report scales that assess the tendency to 
act without thinking (e.g., “I act on the spur of the moment”) and behavioral tasks that require 
individuals to resist making automatic, reactive responses to specific stimuli.  Studies of self-
reported impulse control find that this psychological trait improves into early adulthood.
48
  Age 
patterns in studies involving behavioral tasks are more complex. On simple tasks requiring only 
that participants inhibit an automatic response, individuals demonstrate adult levels of self-
                                                 
43
 See Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk-Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision-
Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study 41 DEV. PSYCHOL. 625, 625-35 (2005); Karol Silva, 
Jason Chein, & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescents in Peer Groups Make More Prudent Decisions When a Slightly 
Older Adult is Present 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 322, 322-30 (2016). 
44
 See Dustin Albert, Jason Chein, & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influences on Adolescent Decision Making 22 CURR. 
DIR. PSYCHOL. SCI. 114, 114-120 (2013). 
45
 See Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 43.  
46
 See Ashley Smith, Jason Chein, & Laurence Steinberg, Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking Even When the 
Probabilities of Negative Outcomes are Known 50 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1564, 1564-68 (2014).  
47
 See Bernd Figner, Rachael J. Mackinlay, Friedrich Wilkening, & Elke U. Weber, Affective and Deliberative 
Processes in Risky Choice: Age Differences in Risk Taking in the Columbia Card Task 35 J. EXP. PSYCHOL. LEARN. 
MEM. COGN. 709, 709-30 (2009). 
48
 See Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and 
Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model 44 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764-78 (2008); Steinberg, supra note 11 
on 4. 
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regulation by mid-adolescence.
49
 In contrast, mature performance is not observed until early 
adulthood when tasks involve distractions that cause attentional interference or that require 
planning and complex reasoning.
50
  
The most interesting recent research measuring impulse control has compared responses 
to behavioral tasks under neutral (non-emotional) and emotional conditions. These studies have 
found that adolescents perform more poorly on self-control tasks under emotional conditions and 
that performance under both conditions under both neutral and emotional conditions improves 
into adulthood.
51
 A major study sponsored by the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on 
Law and Neuroscience (of which two of us were members) is illustrative. In this research, almost 
150 adolescents, (between 13 and 17), young adults (18 to 21) and older adults (age 22 to 25) 
were asked to perform a standard task measuring self control under neutral conditions and 
conditions involving positive and negative emotional arousal (anticipation of winning money 
versus hearing an aversive sound). Under conditions of positive arousal, adolescents’ 
performance on the self-control task was substantially poorer than that of the two adult groups, 
while under conditions of negative arousal, both the adolescent and young adult group performed 
more poorly than the older adults. Moreover, under emotionally arousing conditions, young 
adults evinced decreased activation in cognitive control networks and increased activation in 
brain regions implicated in emotional processing; this combination is thought to have contributed 
to poorer performance on the self-control task.
52
 Another recent study found that those 
adolescents whose self-control was disrupted during emotionally arousing tasks engaged in more 
risk-taking during driving simulation tasks than did same-aged individuals whose self-control 
                                                 
49
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find no differences in cognitive control between mid-adolescents and adults. See Jessica R. Andrews-Hanna et al., 
Cognitive Control in Adolescence: Neural Underpinnings and Relation to Self-Report Behaviors 6 PLOS ONE, 
e21598, 1-14 (2011). 
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neutral conditions, adolescents perform more poorly than older adults. See Cohen, supra note 6 on 2.  
52
 See Alexandra O. Cohen et al., The Impact of Emotional States on Cognitive Control Circuitry and Function 28 J. 
COG. NEUROSCI. 446, 446-59 (2016). 
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was less disrupted.
53
 Other studies have shown that social arousal, created by the presence of 
peers, activates reward regions in the adolescent brain,
54
 which in turn is associated with riskier 
decision making.
55
  The evidence that emotional contexts interfere with self-control in 
adolescence sheds light on teenagers’ heightened tendency to engage in risk taking in 
emotionally and socially arousing contexts.
56
   
*   *   * 
Together with research demonstrating that adolescents tend to evince greater reward 
seeking and relatively less self-regulation compared to adults, studies also show that these 
psychological traits are linked with greater engagement in risk taking. For example, higher levels 
of reward seeking have been associated with self-reported substance use, delinquent acts, and 
risky driving, as well as risk taking on several laboratory measures of risk taking. Similarly, 
greater impulsivity has been associated with higher rates of self-reported substance use and 
delinquent activity, as well as with increased risk taking on behavioral risk taking tasks.
57
  
B. Dual Systems Model of Risk Taking.  
Developmental scientists in recent years have offered “dual systems” or “maturational 
imbalance” models in seeking to explicate the relationship between emotional immaturity and 
risk-taking. Brain maturation comprises several processes that vary in their developmental 
timetable across different brain regions: Dual systems models emphasize research showing that 
brain systems involved in reward seeking and those regulating self-control follow different 
developmental trajectories.
58
 This imbalance, it is believed, results in poor regulation of 
                                                 
53
 See Morgan Botdorf, Gail Rosenbaum, Jamie Patrianakos, Laurence Steinberg & Jason Chein, Adolescent Risk-
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323-32 (2013).  
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CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 263-284 (L Balter & C S Tamis-LeMonda 3 ed. 
2016).  
58
 See B.J. Casey, Beyond Simple Models of Self-Control to Circuit-Based Accounts of Adolescent Behavior, 66 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 295, 298–300 (2015); Elizabeth P. Shulman et al., The Dual Systems Model:  Review, 
Reappraisal, and Reaffirmation, 17 DEVELOPMENTAL COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 103, 103–05 (2016). 
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emotions and a tendency to focus on the immediate rewards of choices, while discounting long-
term costs; this combination increases inclinations to engage in risky behavior, including 
offending.
59
 
Neurodevelopmental research indicates that the development of subcortical brain regions 
implicated in socioemotional processing is more or less completed by adolescence. As explained 
above, these developments stimulate reward seeking and increase sensitivity to peers, beginning 
with the onset of puberty and diminishing as individuals mature into young adulthood, such that 
these responses are particularly powerful during adolescence. But the prefrontal cortex and other 
brain regions involved in impulse control and emotional regulation develop slowly through 
adolescence and are not mature until early adulthood.
60
 The prefrontal cortex plays a key role in 
advanced cognitive abilities, including planning ahead, comparing risk and reward, and self-
regulation. Immaturity in the prefrontal cortex is thought to make adolescents more susceptible 
to impetuous decisionmaking and more vulnerable to the effects of emotional and social arousal 
on cognitive functioning than are mature adults.
61
  
Maturation of the prefrontal cortex involves multiple processes that are ongoing during 
adolescence but completed at different ages.
62
 For example, synaptic pruning, which increases 
the efficiency of information processing, is largely complete by mid-adolescence; thus basic 
cognitive capacities of reasoning and understanding are adultlike by about age 15 and improve 
little in later years. In contrast, connectivity between prefrontal regions and the regions that 
process rewards and respond to emotional and social stimuli social are not fully established until 
individuals are in their mid-twenties.
63
  These connections are critically important to emotional 
regulation and impulse control. The prefrontal regions are implicated in feedback evaluation, 
integrating experiential information to guide future behavior, and controlling emotional impulses 
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in favor of long-term goals.
64
 The lack of functional connectivity leaves adolescents more prone 
than adults to making emotion-based decisions with inadequate cognitive oversight and suggests 
why aspects of social and emotional functioning are slower to mature than basic cognitive 
functioning. Adolescents’ deficient capacity to regulate behavior in the face of highly arousing 
stimuli may lead to suboptimal decisionmaking in contexts requiring the coordination of emotion 
and thinking. In sum, brain systems that govern “cold cognition” (thinking under neutral 
conditions) reaches adult levels of maturity long before those that govern “hot cognition” 
(thinking under conditions of social and emotional arousal). 
65
 
*   *   * 
c. Cross-cultural Research on Brain Development. 
For the most part, the developmental brain research that has informed our understanding of 
various aspects of the dual systems model has been conducted in the United States and a few 
Western European countries (most notably, the Netherlands).
66
 Because expectations and 
norms for adolescent behavior vary considerably around the world, it is important to ask 
whether the account of the sensation-seeking, impulsive teenager that emerges from these 
studies accurately represents young people in other cultural and economic contexts. 
Adolescence in America and much of Western Europe is a time during which a certain 
degree of recklessness, especially in its socially acceptable forms, is tolerated—and perhaps 
even encouraged. Does this characterization of adolescents apply to young people growing 
up in less individualistic (and perhaps less permissive) cultural contexts? 
A recent extensive study of more than 5,000 people between the ages of 10 and 30 from 11 
different countries suggests that it does. Laurence Steinberg and colleagues used identical 
test batteries to measure likely contributors to adolescent risk taking in a diverse sample of 
countries (China, Colombia, Cyprus, India, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, the Philippines, Sweden, 
Thailand, and the United States) to determine whether the trajectories of sensation seeking, 
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self-control, and risk-taking are similar in these varied cultural contexts. Importantly, some 
of these countries are relatively more tolerant of adolescent recklessness (e.g., Sweden, and 
the United States), whereas in others, young people are expected to demonstrate strong self-
control (e.g., China and Jordan). Although there were differences among countries in patterns 
of psychological functioning, there were important and striking similarities.   
Three such similarities are especially relevant to the present discussion: 
First, age trajectories of sensation-seeking and self-control that have been described in 
studies of American youth were observed internationally.
67
 Scores on a composite measure 
of sensation-seeking (combining both self-reports and behavioral indicators) followed an 
inverted U-shaped pattern, increasing between preadolescence and late adolescence, peaking 
during the late teen years, and declining thereafter. On average, the peak was observed at a 
slightly older age (19 years) than had been reported in previous studies of American youth.  
Perhaps this is due to somewhat later onset of puberty, which has been shown to contribute to 
the increase in reward sensitivity in adolescence,
68
 in less developed nations than in 
developed ones; this would shift the average peak in sensation seeking to an older age when 
the sample is aggregated. In contrast, self-control matured gradually between preadolescence 
and the mid-20s, at which point it plateaued in some countries (e.g., China, Italy) but 
continued to mature further in others (e.g., Colombia, Cyprus); generally speaking, the 
prolonged maturation of self-control into the late-20s was more likely to be seen in countries 
in which the increase during adolescence was less dramatic. Taken together, these results 
suggest that the characterization of the late teen years as a time during which reward seeking 
is heightened and self-regulation is still maturing applies cross-culturally. 
Second, the researchers found in other countries the inverted-U shaped trajectory of risk-
taking that has been observed in the United States, with risky behavior more common during 
adolescence than before or after.
69
 This set of analyses distinguished between real-world risk 
taking, measured through self-reports of involvement in activities such as drinking, riding 
with an intoxicated driver, vandalism, and fighting, and risk taking propensity, assessed with 
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experimental tasks such as a the video driving game described earlier. The authors 
hypothesized that age patterns in real-world risk taking would be more culturally variable 
than age patterns in risk taking propensity, since the former is both a function of 
developmental immaturity and contextual opportunity, whereas the latter is not influenced by 
contextual conditions (i.e., the test setting was identical across the various countries). This 
hypothesis was confirmed: Countries were significantly more similar with respect to 
trajectories of risk taking propensity than with respect to real world risk taking.  Further, as 
expected, risk taking propensity peaked earlier than did real-world risk taking, suggesting 
that the manifestation of adolescents’ inherent inclination to engage in risky behavior is 
delayed by the real world context in which development occurs. Finally, the peak age for 
antisocial risk taking was earlier (around age 19, similar to that reported in studies of the 
“age-crime curve”) than that for health risk taking (which peaked in the mid-20s), 
presumably because the latter can be delayed by societally imposed constraints that are age-
related (for example, age restrictions on purchasing alcohol). This study is especially relevant 
to our interest in this essay, because it shows how the maturationally-driven tendencies 
inherent in adolescence can be tempered by social context. 
Third, the researchers observed in the international sample the “maturity gap” found in 
American studies (described above),
70
 in which cognitive abilities such as working memory 
reach adult levels of maturity well before the psychosocial capacities thought to contribute to 
reckless behavior in adolescence. 
71
 Age patterns in cognitive abilities were far more similar 
internationally than patterns in psychosocial capacities; this likely is due to relatively greater 
cultural variability in expectations for psychosocial maturity than for intellectual 
competence. Most importantly, whereas the main period for maturation of cognitive 
competence was during early adolescence (tending to plateau around age 16), in virtually all 
of the countries studied considerable psychosocial maturation took place during the late teens 
and early 20s.   
* 
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 This Part has explained that psychosocial factors associated with adolescent brain 
development contribute to a tendency toward risk-taking that declines as individuals mature. 
These tendencies are normative in adolescence and found across cultures. In the next Part, we 
turn to the questions of how these inclinations interact with social context and why teenagers 
vary substantially in the extent and form of risk-taking.     
II. Social Environment and Risky Behavior in Adolescence 
Risk-taking in adolescence is driven by developmental factors, but as this Part explains, 
the individual adolescent’s social context plays a critical role in triggering risky behavior; it also 
influences the forms of risk-taking in which the teenager engages. As the description of 
behavioral and biological research in Part I explained, endogenous developmental traits and 
tendencies associated with adolescence contribute to a heightened sensitivity to the social 
environment and an inclination to respond intensely to exciting and threatening stimuli in that 
environment; these stimuli contribute to emotional arousal, which in the face of immature self-
regulatory competence, can overwhelm the adolescent’s cognitive capacity for rational choice, 
contributing to reckless behavior. This dynamic interaction is especially likely to be triggered in 
the presence or with the encouragement of peers, since adolescents are particularly oriented 
toward peers and susceptible to peer influence.
72
 Peers play an important role in determining the 
extent and form of risk-taking in which an individual adolescent engages. Thus, an important 
contextual variable contributing to whether an adolescent becomes involved in criminal behavior 
is the degree to which his or her peer group is antisocial.
73
 This Part explores how developmental 
changes in emotional arousability and self-regulation interact with the adolescent’s social context 
to shape his or her peer affiliations in ways that can lead to involvement in risky activities; it also 
suggests why and how these tendencies dissipate and risk-taking declines with maturation.    
A. Decision-making in a Neutral Context  
As the discussion in Part I confirms, by mid-adolescence, individuals have the cognitive 
capacity to make rational decisions that is similar to that of adults. A teenager can understand 
and process information, engage in hypothetical thinking to compare alternative options and 
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make reasoned decisions.
74
 In short, when not subject to exogenous influences that undermine 
rationality, the normative adolescent usually is a competent decision-maker. This has been 
confirmed, for instance, in studies of competence to stand trial, which does not improve after age 
15.
75
 
Much research supports the conclusion that adolescent decision-making is comparable to 
adults under neutral conditions, but deteriorates when disrupted by external stimuli that 
contribute to emotional arousal. Early studies finding that adolescents were adult-like in their 
decisionmaking were conducted in laboratory settings under conditions in which the teenage 
subjects were undistracted by external influences and had time to respond to vignettes without 
stress.
76
 Two important bodies of research focused on comprehension of Miranda rights and 
ability to give informed consent to medical treatment. These studies found that that by mid –
adolescence, teenagers performed similarly to adults.  
More recent research has sought to compare the impact on adolescent decision-making of 
neutral settings and settings in which subjects are exposed to external stimuli associated with 
emotional arousal. To test decision-making under states of emotional arousal, researchers have 
designed laboratory tasks with reward components (e.g., presenting images of happy faces or 
offering a monetary reward) and threat components (e.g., exposing participants to the possibility 
of hearing an aversive noise). Findings from these studies suggest that adolescents act more 
impulsively in the presence of both rewarding and threatening stimuli than under more neutral 
conditions.
77
  Impulsive decision-making in the presence of an emotional stimulus has been 
associated with decreased activity in brain regions implicated in behavioral control and increased 
activity in brain regions involved in emotional processing. Research evidence also suggests that, 
compared to adults, adolescents take more risks in the presence of rewarding stimuli.
78
 In 
contrast, adolescents show comparably better impulse control and engage in less risky decision-
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making in neutral contexts (e.g., in the absence of a reward or peers). Thus, research examining 
the impact of emotional stimuli on adolescent decision-making generally suggests that teenagers 
demonstrate a neural sensitivity to both rewards and threats that undermines impulse control and 
increases risky decision-making.  
The interaction of social context with the decision-making competence of older 
adolescents is important in some legal settings. For example, a mature minor is likely competent 
to make a medical decision, which typically is made in a relatively neutral context.  The 
adolescent is not likely to be subject to external conditions that contribute to emotional arousal or 
impulsive decision-making. Peers are seldom present and the inclination toward sensation-
seeking is unlikely to be stimulated by the anticipated short-term rewards of treatment, which are 
likely to be gradual.
79
 Given these conditions, it is not surprising perhaps that mature minors are 
authorized to consent to some medical treatments without involving their parents, because they 
are presumed competent to do so.
80
  In contrast, although laboratory studies have found that 
adolescents comprehend the meaning of Miranda rights,
81
 there is good reason to question 
whether a juvenile in the real world setting of an interrogation room is likely to make a 
competent decision about waiving or asserting these rights. The stress of interrogation is 
compounded by police tactics that combine implicit threats of punishment unless the juvenile 
agrees to waiver and promises of rewards (such as permission to end the interrogation). 
Substantial evidence indicates that juveniles waive their Miranda rights at a much higher rate 
than do adults, and confess falsely at a higher rate.
82
 It seems likely that the competence that 
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teenagers show in the research setting is compromised by emotional factors in this social context, 
justifying special scrutiny of juveniles’ waivers and confessions.83 
A final example provides a transition to our discussion of adolescent risk taking in the 
next section. In laboratory studies, adolescents are capable of perceiving the risks associated with 
different behaviors as well as adults, and are no worse than adults at estimating their 
vulnerability to risk.
84
 In fact, some studies suggest that adolescents overestimate the risks 
associated with various§ behaviors, including getting sick from alcohol or contracting a sexually 
transmitted infection.
85
 But in the presence of peers and free of adult supervision, teenagers’ 
cognitive awareness of risk may do little to deter participation in dangerous, but exciting, 
activities such as drinking, drug use, fast driving and criminal offending. The confluence of 
(exogenous) opportunities for participation, and the adolescent’s inclinations toward reward-
seeking can lead to reckless choices driven by emotional arousal. Through similar mechanisms, 
the perception of threat in the social context can lead to emotional arousal, undermining 
rationality and contributing to impulsive decisions.
86
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B. Risk-taking in Adolescence:  The Risk-Inclined Individual in Risky Social Context.  
As the preceding section suggests, in a neutral setting, a normative adolescent is a 
competent decision-maker who perceives the risks of dangerous choices as accurately as adults. 
In this section, we explore why many adolescents (and young adults) engage in risk-taking 
behavior at higher rates than older adults. We posit that much risk-taking behavior is a product of 
an adolescent inclined toward exciting or rewarding experiences (the normative adolescent), 
whose social context presents opportunities facilitating the pursuit of those experiences and 
whose peers encourage engagement in risk behaviors or enhance the salience of the potential 
rewards associated with risk taking. “Opportunity” has two components: First, the risky activity 
must be accessible in the teenager’s social context; and second, the adolescent associates with 
willing peers who encourage participation.
87
   
1. Parental Influence and Accessibility of Risky Activity.  
Adolescents are free to engage in risky behavior to a greater extent than younger children 
in part because they are subject to less supervision by parents and other adult authority figures. 
Developmentally appropriate separation from parents and increased freedom to associate with 
peers without supervision is a necessary part of normal maturation and healthy development, a 
process through which teenagers learn to make their own decisions without external control.
88
 
But less monitoring by parents who (presumably) mature impulse control and an interest in 
promoting their children’s welfare leaves teenagers with less protection against developmentally 
normative impulsive choices and behavior. 
Some parents, of course, exercise more supervision over their teenage children than 
others. The role that parents assume during this developmental stage can affect whether 
adolescents are allowed to pursue risky activities without constraint or are subject to appropriate 
discipline (which, to some extent, can limit opportunities for risk-taking).
89
 The challenge for 
parents is to find the right balance between rigid restriction of their children’s freedom and lax 
disengagement. Developmentalists explain that authoritative parenting is critically important to 
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healthy development in adolescence.
90
 Authoritative parenting involves active engagement with 
the teenager’s life, but not excessive monitoring, which can either generate intense opposition or 
inhibit development of the ability to make autonomous choices and live independently. The 
upshot is that even the best parenting will not prevent adolescent risk-taking. Optimally, parents 
(and other adults in authority) will present adolescents with opportunities to take 
developmentally appropriate risks, such as playing on a sports team, and seek to minimize 
opportunities for engaging in risks that compromise adolescents’ health and well-being. 
The freedom that adolescents need to separate from parents and learn to be independent, 
combined with the normative traits and tendencies of this developmental stage, increases 
teenagers’ vulnerability to involvement in risky activities. The extent to which teenagers engage 
in risk-taking, and the form of that risk-taking, depends on opportunities presented in the 
adolescent’s social context.  For example, the leading cause of death for adolescents and young 
adults is motor vehicle crashes.
91
 Alcohol use plays a part in this statistic (see below), but car 
racing (or just driving fast) is an exciting activity for young males, and one that reward-seeking 
teenagers are likely to pursue, given the opportunity. But most teens will only engage in this 
activity when they are licensed to operate a vehicle by the state. Thus, while a 14 year old has 
reward-seeking inclinations that are similar to those of an older teen, he will seldom engage in 
reckless driving.
92
 Similarly, most New York City teenagers simply do not have the opportunity 
to engage in this form of risk-taking.
93
   
The same analysis applies to other forms of risk-taking such as alcohol and drug use. 
Although under-age drinking is common, acquiring alcohol becomes easier as individuals 
approach the legal minimum drinking age. College students and other young adults engage in 
underage drinking at far higher rates than do high school students.
94
 Indeed, one rationale for 
setting the minimum age for purchasing alcohol at 21 was to reduce illegal drinking among high 
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school students.
95
 Lawmakers thought that lives would be saved by creating a substantial gap 
between the age at which individuals have ready access to alcohol and the minimum driving age. 
But because alcohol is legal for adults (who are presumed less inclined toward risk-taking), it is 
readily available in every community, and not surprisingly, a relatively high percentage of 
adolescents experiment with drinking.  Also unsurprisingly, given the relatively lower driving 
age in the United States than in most of the developed world, automobile fatalities among 
adolescents are higher here than abroad.
96
 
Illegal drug use is another risky activity that might well appeal to many normative 
adolescents--reward-seeking individuals with immature impulse control, who are inclined to 
focus on short-term benefits and discount long-term costs. But drugs, in contrast to alcohol, 
generally cannot be acquired legally, and use and sale can result in criminal penalties. Thus 
access and opportunities to engage in this risky activity are more limited and drug use among 
adolescents is less prevalent than alcohol use; again, the teenager’s social context play a role in 
the form of risk-taking teenagers choose. 
Teenagers’ inclination to engage in unsafe sex provides a somewhat different variation on 
the theme, but also demonstrates how social context can increase or decrease the inclination to 
engage in risky activities. If teenagers are encouraged to use contraceptives and condoms, and 
such protection is readily available, the incidence of unsafe sex and pregnancy will be lower than 
if protection is difficult to obtain.
97
 The immediate decision to have sex is likely to be driven by 
the reward-seeking, impulsive inclinations of adolescents, who may fail to consider the potential 
serious long term consequences. But if the adolescent can easily acquire contraceptives, the 
decision to have safe sex can be made in a more neutral setting in which the adolescent can 
rationally consider the benefit of avoiding pregnancy and disease.
98
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Adolescent involvement in criminal activity receives more attention from policymakers 
than any other form of teenage risk-taking. We postpone a comprehensive analysis of this issue 
until we have explored the role of peer influence, the primary dimension of social context 
influencing teenage criminal choices. But as our analysis in this section suggests,  many other 
variables in the adolescents’ social context can increase or decrease the likelihood that teenage 
risk-taking involves criminal activity, and, if so, the form of criminal activity. We have discussed 
the role of parents and the availability (or not) of activities that might tempt the reward-seeking 
teenager. But social context also includes the adolescent’s neighborhood, school and community, 
each of which can either constrain or encourage the adolescent’s inclination to get involved in 
risky, antisocial activities. The school, for example, may be a well-managed facility in which 
discipline is maintained and students, supervised by authoritative adults, engage in positive 
learning experiences and extra-curricular activities. Alternatively, the school can be a chaotic 
setting in which teachers and administrators have little control over students, and those students 
who are so inclined are free to pursue antisocial activities.  In either case, social context plays a 
key role in deterring or facilitating antisocial activities.  
2. Peer Influence and Risky Activity 
Peers constitute the environmental stimuli that most powerfully influence adolescents’ 
involvement in risky activities. As Part I showed, adolescents are susceptible to peer influence to 
a greater extent than either younger children or adults, and also seek peer approval, which may 
involve initiating activities that peers will find exciting or pleasurable. In addition, recent 
research has shown that the mere presence of peers activates the brain’s reward circuitry to a 
much greater extent among adolescents than adults, and that this heightened activation is linked 
to increased risk-taking.
99
 Thus, peers play a major role in creating opportunities for risk-taking 
and in influencing whether an adolescent pursues particular opportunities otherwise available in 
the social environment.   
The adolescent propensity for risk-taking is normative, but its form and extent are often 
driven by peers. Indeed, despite the hard-wired developmental traits that facilitate engagement in 
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risky behavior, solitary risk-taking is less common among adolescents than among adults.
100
 In 
real world settings, adolescents and young adults typically drink alcohol, use drugs, exceed the 
speed limit, and (particularly) commit crimes in the presence of, or in complicity with, peers to a 
greater extent than older adults.
101
   It is often forgotten that peers can influence teens in both 
pro-social and anti-social directions.
102
 Pro-social peers can reinforce the goals of getting good 
grades and excelling in socially useful activities.
103
 Indeed, Research demonstrates that peers can 
have direct positive impact on adolescent risk behavior. For example, one laboratory-based study 
using a driving simulation game found that adolescents ages 16-17 demonstrated safer driving 
while in the presence of a cautious (rather than risky) peer, regardless of individual differences in 
susceptibility to peer pressure.
104
  But peers who encourage, facilitate or support involvement in 
risky activities can serve as catalysts that mobilize the adolescent’s proclivity for sensation-
seeking and direct it toward potentially harmful actions.   
Peer groups vary in the extent to which antisocial risk-taking plays a role in their social 
interactions. Some teenagers associate with peers who only occasionally engage in dangerous 
risk-taking, while others are part of antisocial peer groups heavily involved in one or more forms 
of illicit activities.
105
 But no sharp dichotomy typically exists between pro-social and anti-social 
peers. A broad range of adolescents are attracted to exciting activities that may be associated 
with physical and social risks. Thus generally pro-social teenagers can sometimes instigate or 
participate in potentially harmful activities, just as antisocial adolescents also sometimes respond 
to peer influence to engage in socially desirable behavior.
106
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Most adolescents experiment with some mix of the risky behaviors described earlier.  But 
whether a teenager engages in a particular form of risk-taking, and to what extent, is influenced 
by its availability, and also influenced by the preferences of the peer community, interacting with 
broader cultural factors that can vary over time and across cultures. For example, teenage 
drinking and drug use have been more popular in some historic periods than others, and peer 
sub-communities may vary in their substance of choice.  Criminal activity is also influenced by 
cultural factors. Criminologists credit the widespread availability of guns as a key contributor to 
the spike in juvenile homicide rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
107
 Disputes that were 
settled through fistfights in an earlier era were resolved with guns in the late 20
th
 century. 
 Only recently has research directly shed light on how the interaction between the 
individual adolescent and the peer group facilitates participation in risky activities. A study by 
Jason Chein and colleagues found that the presence of peers leads to increased risk-taking by 
adolescents but not adults. The study also found that peer presence activated the brain regions 
associated with the anticipation of potential rewards in adolescents, suggesting that greater 
neural activation in the brain’s reward centers is associated with increased risk taking.  
Importantly, in this study, subjects were merely told that they were being observed by peers from 
another room; the responses in brain activity and risk-taking were not due to actual peer 
pressure.
108
  Other studies from this team of scientists have shown that, even in the absence of 
opportunities to engage in risk-taking, the presence of peers activates adolescents’ reward centers 
and increases adolescents’ preference for immediate rewards.109  
It is possible to hypothesize with some confidence the dynamic between individual 
adolescents and peers that leads to risky activities in real-world settings when we consider the 
following:  a) normative adolescents are particularly susceptible to peer influence due to 
heightened sensitivity in the social brain; b) peers collectively constitute the primary component 
of social context for the individual adolescent, and c) those peers themselves typically are 
sensation-seeking adolescents, who are prone to acting impulsively under conditions of 
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emotional arousal, and whose sensitivity to rewards is activated in the peer group context. In 
combination, it is unsurprising that the interaction among adolescent peers can be volatile, as one 
or more teenager serves as an active catalyst, encouraging others to participate in risky behavior 
that none would undertake on his or her own.   
This dynamic interaction between individual and peers plays out against a backdrop in 
which opportunities to engage in risky activities vary, as described above. The patterns of risk-
taking varies with age; for example, 15-year-olds drink alcohol less than 20-year-olds. It also 
varies with parental norms and supervision, neighborhood, school setting and other factors that 
determine whether, how, and if sensation-seeking adolescents act on their impulses. 
It is well established that risk-taking declines as individuals mature. Most forms of risky 
behavior peak in late adolescence and early adulthood,
110
 a trend that is observed across cultures 
that vary in their social, political, cultural, and economic contexts.
111
 This pattern likely reflects 
the reality that many forms of risky behavior are driven by the interaction of an immature 
individual and a social context of peers who encourage risk-taking.
112
 As adolescents mature, 
their propensity for sensation-seeking declines and the brain’s executive functions improve, 
along with communication between the pre-frontal cortex and emotional centers of the brain. 
This maturation process results in better emotional regulation and behavioral control in arousing 
contexts, reducing impulsivity and the inclination to engage in risk-taking, including criminal 
activity. Importantly, this developmental process toward maturity proceeds in most adolescents, 
such that the individual’s social context changes as his peers also mature; he is no longer 
surrounded by sensation-seeking peers, inclined, as he was, to make impulsive choices when 
emotionally aroused.
113
  
A key insight of this analysis is that the primary exogenous influence on normative 
adolescent risk-taking is other adolescents, who as individuals are themselves inclined toward 
risk-taking, and who collectively constitute the main component of the teenager's social context. 
As individual adolescents mature, they become less susceptible to peer influence, less inclined 
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toward sensation-seeking and less impulsive; this maturation process also diminishes the 
individual’s role as part of a risk-promoting peer context. Thus, each adolescent is both an 
individual maturing into adulthood who is becoming less inclined toward risk taking, and part of 
the social context that is becoming less facilitative of risk-taking, in part, as discussed below, due 
to the assumption of work and relationship responsibilities.
114
  
C. Adolescent Criminal Activity and Social Context.  
 In conversations about crime prevention and public protection, juveniles are usually 
treated as a sub-category of offenders—a group that offends at high rates due to adolescent 
immaturity. But most adolescent involvement in criminal activity has more in common with 
teenage drinking, unsafe sex and car racing than with the criminal choices of adult offenders.  
For our purposes, it is more useful to view juvenile offending as a form of adolescent risk-taking 
than as a discrete form of antisocial behavior. It is often observed that age 17-18 is the peak age 
for involvement in criminal activity, and that the crime rate falls steeply after the early 20s.
115
 
Other risky behavior follows a similar pattern, and developmentalists generally think the same 
biological and psychological mechanisms underlie criminal activity as other forms of risk-
taking.
116
 Thus, juvenile offending often may be attributed to youths acting upon a 
developmentally normative drive toward novel, exciting experiences. In the appropriate social 
context, this drive for sensation and risk is directed toward antisocial or delinquent behaviors.   
Like other forms of risk-taking in adolescence, criminal activity involves a dynamic 
interaction between the still maturing teenager and his or her social context. And as is true with 
other risk-taking, the impact of social context can deter or facilitate antisocial behavior. Thus, 
authoritative parents can provide structure and supervision for their children that reduce the risk 
of youthful offending, while disengaged parents likely perform no such deterrent function. 
Indeed, research suggests that greater parental monitoring is associated with longitudinal 
decreases in delinquency and aggression among young adolescents, regardless of affiliations 
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with delinquent peers.
117
 Neighborhoods also vary as social contexts for offending. In low-crime 
neighborhoods, non-criminal residents perform an informal monitoring function that may 
discourage criminal activity, simply by being out and about on the streets and sidewalks and in 
the parks.
118
 In high-crime neighborhoods, in contrast, residents may stay indoors out of fear for 
their safety, providing greater opportunity for criminal activity.
119
 Neighborhood conditions may 
also reinforce both antisocial behaviors and psychological traits such as impulsivity. Community 
violence has been linked to disrupted behavioral control
120
 and perpetual hyper-arousal among 
youth.
121
 Further, dangerous environments can teach youth that violence is an effective method 
of problem solving, and therefore violence and delinquency become learned behaviors.
122
 For 
individuals living in high-crime neighborhoods who feel chronically threatened, carrying a gun 
and acting reflexively or impulsively are likely adaptive behaviors. As suggested above, schools 
also can be safe and supervised educational settings, or environments in which adolescents, 
gathered together in close proximity for extended periods, are subject to few exogenous 
constraints and many temptations to engage in antisocial behavior. Further, the extent to which 
youth are engaged in educational pursuits and feel connected to their school is correlated with 
long-term effects on adolescent delinquency and substance use.
123
  
As we have indicated, peers constitute the element of social context most likely to 
activate individual adolescents’ reward-seeking tendencies, and typically peers are the most 
important contextual contributor to risk-taking. Research confirms that affiliation with antisocial 
peers is the factor most predictive of juveniles’ involvement in criminal activity.124 Even 
adolescents who are not inherently delinquent or antisocial are more likely to engage in 
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antisocial behaviors when they socialize in groups of teens in unstructured, unsupervised 
settings; this finding highlights the important role of context in facilitating adolescent risk 
behavior.
125
  In this section, we examine how antisocial peer affiliation develops and probe the 
interaction between the individual and his or her adolescent peer group as that interaction relates 
to offending. This interaction can shed some light on the functioning of juvenile gangs.  It also 
informs our understanding of the role of peers in the trend toward desistence in early adulthood.  
1. Affiliation with Antisocial Peer Groups 
Although most adolescents engage in risk-taking, including some forms of criminal 
activity, most do not associate with peers whose risk-taking takes the form of chronic or serious 
criminal activity. Why do some adolescents tend to affiliate with antisocial peers while others 
find friends less likely to get into serious trouble? This question has been the focus of some 
research in recent years; not surprisingly, it appears that several factors contribute to peer group 
affiliation.  
First, the tendencies and traits of the individual adolescent play a role in peer 
associations. Some teens are more inclined toward sensation-seeking and are more impulsive 
than the norm, and may be attracted to the extreme risk-taking activities of antisocial peers; 
others may lack the social skills to affiliate with more desirable peer groups. Studies of peer 
group formation show that some teenagers resort to antisocial peer groups because they are 
rejected from higher-status crowds.
126
 Of course, intense sensation seekers might also associate 
with peer groups that pursue extreme sports or other dangerous activities, but some will likely be 
attracted to a peer group that engages in criminal activity if such a group is available or if access 
to more prosocial groups is constrained.     
Parents play an important, if indirect, role in their children’s peer group associations. 
Research has found that parents’ values and preferences about their children’s associations seems 
to influence adolescent peer group affiliations.
127
 If parents are distant and fail to monitor their 
children, or if parents themselves endorse antisocial or criminal norms, it is more likely that 
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teenagers will affiliate with deviant peer groups.
128
  One study found evidence that parents 
fostered certain traits or behavior patterns in their children, which then predicted peer group 
affiliation.
129
  Moreover, parents’ influence on peer affiliation likely predates adolescence. 
Snydor and colleagues found that parental failure to discipline their children’s antisocial 
behavior to be a precursor to association with deviant peers.
130
 Parents also determine the 
neighborhood, community, and school in which the teen will live, and this in turn will determine 
the peer groups that are available for affiliation. Of course, parents themselves may have few 
residential options and economic and social constraints that restrict poor families to high-crime 
neighborhoods can mean that delinquent peers are ubiquitous. In this situation, the adolescent’s 
social context may offer few pro-social peer group options. 
This last point is important in understanding why adolescents in some neighborhoods and 
communities are far more likely to associate with deviant peers than teenagers in other settings. 
In some neighborhoods, most male peer groups are committed to involvement in criminal 
activity; the realistic options may not include pro-social peer groups. The choices available to 
individual teens may also be limited by neighborhood geography; urban teenage gang members 
typically live in close proximity to one another. The alternative of avoiding peer affiliation 
altogether is unattractive to most teenagers, although it may appeal to parents seeking to protect 
their children from gang involvement. Further, in high-crime neighborhoods, peer group 
affiliation may be deemed a source of security as well as excitement and camaraderie. Hostility 
among adolescent peer groups may leave the unaffiliated youth vulnerable to attack and 
harassment. And gang membership provides a defense against attacks by other gangs.
131
 The 
upshot is that adolescents in poor, high-crime neighborhoods may be very limited in their peer 
group options; many will affiliate with deviant peers, as “the only game in town.” and are  likely 
to be influenced by that association to engage in criminal activity. 
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2. Peer Group Influence and Juvenile Offending. 
Adolescents’ susceptibility to peer influence and desire to please peers can influence 
juvenile offending in two ways. First, adolescents offend in groups at substantially higher rates 
than do adults.
132
 The impact of peers on one another in a group setting likely enhances the 
salience of potential rewards associated with certain behaviors, leading to emotional arousal and 
sensation-seeking, which in turn may overwhelm the adolescent’s still maturing ability to control 
impulsive behavior. Thus, the prospect of acquiring money or vanquishing a rival gang that 
poses a threat becomes more exciting in the peer context. Each youth is also sensitive to the 
approval of others in the group. As the planning of the crime proceeds, withdrawal by individual 
youths is likely very costly, as it may lead to rejection and even exclusion from the peer group. 
Moreover, in his emotionally aroused state, the adolescent is more likely to focus on the potential 
short-term rewards of the criminal act, and to pay scant attention to the potential downside.  
The power of peer influence on the individual adolescent operates even without overt 
peer pressure or even presence.
133
 Thus, a second form of peer influence occurs if a teenager acts 
with the goal of positively impressing his peer group. A juvenile seeking peer approval might act 
alone to steal something, in excited anticipation of his friends’ approving response. This 
variation is important for two reasons. First, it suggests that anticipated peer response has a 
powerful influence on adolescents even when peers are not present.
134
 And second, it suggests 
that identifying an adolescent as a leader (or initiator of criminal activity) or follower may 
sometimes not be a meaningful distinction. An adolescent who acts to impress antisocial peers 
may simply be conforming to peer group expectations. 
We can only tentatively describe the actual process through which individual adolescents 
in an antisocial peer group plan and execute a criminal offense; not surprisingly, field research 
has not been undertaken. But the body of developmental knowledge that we have described can 
inform our understanding of the interaction between individuals and peer groups in this context. 
The following scenario comports well with developmental knowledge: Several friends are 
hanging out on a Friday evening when one suggests robbing the local convenience store. As the 
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group discusses the idea, they become excited at the prospect of the cash they will acquire in the 
hold-up; several advocate eagerly for the plan and others join in the enthusiasm. Most do not 
consider the potential risks they may face, including the risk of apprehension or the possibility 
that the store clerk will be armed and will fire in self-defense. They also do not think about the 
cost of a delinquency adjudication to their future lives. Those who do consider the potential risks 
may decide that the benefits of the act (e.g., peer approval, earning money, having fun) outweigh 
the potential costs. Any youth who has qualms about the plan is silent, not wanting to earn the 
anger or ridicule of his friends.  
In situations of gang rivalry, involvement in criminal activity may implicate more 
complex responses in adolescent gang members than the reward-seeking impulses associated 
with juvenile offenses aimed at financial gains.
135
 When juvenile gangs compete with one 
another for territorial dominance, individual members of each gang is likely emotionally aroused 
by the prospect of the gains associated with victory over the rival. But a rival gang also poses a 
threat of physical harm; and adolescents are emotionally aroused by potential threats as well as 
rewards.
136
 The dual sources of emotional arousal experienced by gang members may escalate 
the response, creating in individual members of each gang a hyper-vigilance to anticipated attack 
and urgent desire to preempt the rival in attaining territorial goals. In planning a gang activity, 
individual members are likely to reinforce one another in their excitement about the prospect of 
attaining the goal, with little immediate attention to the risk of injury or death inherent in the 
confrontation. But as the confrontation unfolds, the threat of harm becomes highly salient, 
triggering quick responses. This dynamic interaction between the individual adolescent and his 
peer group in a hostile, threatening, context invites impulsive responses that often involve 
violence. 
137
 
3. Social Context and Limits on Exit. 
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The Supreme Court in its juvenile sentencing opinions has underscored a final point 
about social context and juvenile offending. A juvenile by virtue of his status as a legal minor 
cannot escape his family, neighborhood or his limited options for peer associates.
138
 Unlike an 
adult, who (theoretically, at least) can leave the temptation of a high-crime neighborhood, a 
juvenile cannot extricate himself.
139
 Thus the adolescent whose circumstances have placed him 
in a social context that encourages involvement in crime, does not have the option of moving to a 
community in which he can enjoy the benefit of authoritative parents, an enriched educational 
setting, a safe neighborhood and pro-social peers, elements of social context that would reduce 
the likelihood that he will get involved in serious crime.  
4. Social Context and Desistence from Criminal Activity.  
It is well established that criminal offending increases through adolescence, peaks 
between age 17 and 18 and declines sharply thereafter.
140
 This pattern is similar to that observed 
for other forms of risk-taking, although the peak age varies somewhat for different types of risky 
behavior.
141
 It also seems very likely that the factors contributing to the decline in other risk-
taking in late adolescence and young adulthood also drive desistence from criminal activity. 
Most importantly, desistence from crime is correlated with the declining susceptibility to 
influence from antisocial peers.  Substantial evidence supports that the decline in affiliation with 
antisocial peers as adolescents transition to adulthood is the most important contributor to the 
declining rate of participation in crime post-adolescence.
142
 
 Most adolescents desist from offending (and other forms of risk-taking) through a process 
that is linked to maturation; as the individual adolescent and his peers mature, the dynamic 
interaction that propelled much juvenile offending weakens. Reward- seeking and extreme 
sensitivity to peers, developmentally normal tendencies in adolescence, decline with maturity; as 
the individual ages, he or she is less prone to emotional arousal at the prospect of criminal 
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activity with peers. 
143
At the same time, decision-making improves as the young adult becomes 
less impulsive and the executive functions of the brain operate more effectively, facilitating the 
regulation of emotions and consideration of future consequences.
144
 As noted earlier, because 
this maturation is typical of most adolescents, both the individual and his peers (the most 
important exogenous contributor to adolescent involvement in crime) are changing. The 
individual becomes less inclined to offend, and the peer group is less likely to play its facilitative 
role of inducing emotional arousal and promoting criminal activity. The excitement associated 
with criminal activity declines while the potential costs and risks become more salient.
145
  
As adolescents mature into adulthood, social context changes in other ways that likely 
contribute to desistence from offending.  Robert Sampson and John Laub have argued that 
employment and spousal roles in adulthood encourage desistence from involvement in criminal 
activity.
146
 For most adults, these conventional roles provide structure and a social context that 
limits opportunities for risk-taking. The time demands and routines of work and family 
responsibilities make participation in criminal activity more costly. This account is compatible 
with the rationale for desistence that emphasizes the impact of adolescents’ normal maturation 
on both the individual propensity toward offending and the peer group’s catalytic role. Maturity 
is required to function in the conventional adult roles that bring stability to the lives of formerly 
antisocial youth; sensation-seeking, impulsive adults are unlikely to be successful as employees 
and life partners. Moreover, as peers themselves mature and assume adult roles, social pressure 
to engage in criminal activity likely declines and mainstream social norms encourage responsible 
fulfillment of role obligations.
147
  
D. Non-Normative Antisocial Behavior in Adolescence 
It is well understood that not all offending by juveniles can be explained as a product of 
the interaction between immature, but developmentally normative, adolescents and their peers, 
who are themselves immature teenagers. Some individuals are inclined toward serious antisocial 
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behavior in childhood; in this, they differ in important ways from teens whose involvement in 
criminal activity begins in adolescence. Some early-onset offenders may also desist as they 
mature,
148
 but normative brain development in adolescence, by definition, does not contribute to 
their early maladaptive behavior. Moreover, although most juvenile offending declines sharply 
beginning in late adolescence, some individuals persist in criminal pursuits into adulthood; either 
they have failed to mature or maturation has not led them to desist from criminal activities. 
Although this category of offenders is small compared to normative juveniles, it includes the 
most serious offenders who cause the most social harm.   
Comprehensive examination of early-onset offenders and “life-course-persistent”149 
offenders is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, brief consideration of these individuals 
(and how their involvement in crime differs from that of normative adolescents) is in order. 
Developmentalists and criminologists agree that several factors contribute to serious antisocial 
behavior in childhood, including hyperactivity and attention-deficit disorders, other neurological 
deficits, learning disabilities and inadequate or abusive parenting. Early-onset offenders are often 
children with complex problems whose parents are incapable of providing adequate supervision 
and the support needed to overcome the challenges they face. (Indeed, even adequate parents 
may be unsuccessful in dealing with these children).
150
 Thus, the source of their antisocial 
behavior may endogenous, or it may be the product of an interaction of individual factors and 
childhood social context.  Unlike normative adolescent offenders, however, the individual factors 
are not primarily normal developmental influences- and peers do not constitute the primary 
influence of social context. But when these children persist in their antisocial behavior into 
adolescence, their individual deficits may combine with normative influences associated with 
adolescence, making them particularly vulnerable and likely to engage in criminal activity. 
Some adolescent delinquents become adult criminals; their offending can no longer be 
attributed to normal developmental immaturity and the predictable influence of normative peers. 
This group includes early onset offenders, but also individuals who began to offend in 
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adolescence.
151
 In the latter case, as we discuss below, the individual’s life trajectory may have 
been shaped by his interaction with the justice system, and by sanctions that impede normal 
development. In general, however, the impulsive, sensation-seeking behavior of the adult 
criminal will be taken to represent individual characterological deficits and not residual 
adolescent immaturity from which the individual is likely to emerge. For our purposes, the 
important point is that we currently lack the tools to distinguish accurately during adolescence 
the normative juvenile offender who likely will mature out of his or her tendency to get involved 
in crime from emerging career criminal or the psychopath.
152
 Because the vast majority of 
adolescents who violate the law do not become chronic adult criminals, information about an 
offender’s adolescent misbehavior is seldom predictive of adult criminality.  
III. Correctional Programs as Social Settings 
To this point, we have focused on how the dynamic interaction between the still-maturing 
teenager and his or her peers (and other environmental influences) contributes to risk-taking, 
including criminal activity. But the extreme sensitivity of adolescents to their social context has a 
broader impact on their development to adulthood; the individual’s interaction with her social 
context during adolescence can determine whether he or she accomplishes developmental tasks 
essential to successful maturation. For adolescents in the justice system, correctional facilities 
and programs constitute their social context and can have a critical impact on whether they 
successfully navigate the transition to productive adulthood.  
Developmental psychologists explain that adolescence is a formative period of 
psychological and social development, during which an individual’s experience can shape the 
trajectory of his or her future life. During adolescence, individuals begin to acquire skills and 
capacities necessary for successful maturation and the assumption of conventional adult roles of 
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employee, spouse (or intimate partner) and citizen.
153
  For most adolescents, this maturation 
process depends on several conditions in the social context that provide “opportunity 
structures”154 for healthy development. Two of these conditions represent the obverse of the 
elements of social context that promote antisocial risk-taking The presence of an authoritative 
adult who cares about the youth and can provide guidance and structure,
155
 and membership in a 
pro-social peer group (and minimal influence of antisocial peers). A third important condition of 
a healthy social context is more indirectly implicated in risk-taking: Participation in meaningful 
activities that promote autonomous decision-making and critical thinking. The accomplishment 
of essential developmental tasks in adolescence typically involves reciprocal interaction between 
the individual and a social context that provides these conditions.  
In recent years, this view of adolescence as a formative period in psychological 
development has been buttressed by work in developmental neuroscience indicating that 
adolescence is a heightened period of neural plasticity.
156
 “Plasticity” refers to the capacity of the 
brain to change with experience. Neuroscientists distinguish between two types of plasticity; 
“developmental plasticity” permits large-scale transformations in brain circuitry, including the 
development of new circuits and the disappearance of old, unnecessary ones, while “adult 
plasticity” only allows for minor modifications of existing brain circuits.157 Adolescence is 
thought to be the last period of developmental plasticity.  
Adolescence is a unique period of developmental plasticity in four important respects, all 
of which have implications for juvenile justice policy and practice: 
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First, adolescence is a second period of particularly heightened plasticity, the first being 
the first few years of life. It has long been known that the brain is particularly sensitive to the 
environment during the early years, an observation that has understandably motivated much 
discussion about the importance of investing in high-quality prenatal and postnatal care, child 
care, and early education. But more recent research has revealed that the brain undergoes a 
second burst of plasticity at adolescence. The underlying mechanisms of this burst in plasticity 
have only recently begun to be articulated, but several studies point to the impact of pubertal 
hormones on the brain as its likely trigger.
158
 We have explained that adolescence is a time 
during which individuals are especially sensitive to the social environment. But puberty also 
makes the adolescent brain more responsive to environmental input. An important implication of 
this discovery is that the social context in which the adolescent spends time may have a more 
profound impact on his or her behavior than during childhood or adulthood.  Not surprisingly, 
this knowledge has begun to inform discussions about the treatment of young people in the 
justice system. 
Second, the brain regions that are thought to be especially plastic during adolescence are 
those involving the juvenile’s response to reward and those involving the development of self-
regulation.
159
  Because, as we have explained, the interplay between these brain regions is 
thought to play a crucial role in adolescent risk taking, experiences during adolescence have the 
potential to enhance or diminish normative development in the very parts of the brain implicated 
in criminal and other antisocial behavior. That is, experiences during this period have the 
potential to strengthen or weaken self-control, and to strengthen or weaken reward sensitivity. 
Third, the heightened malleability of the adolescent brain is a dual-edged sword.
160
 On 
the positive side, the susceptibility of the adolescent brain to positive influence makes the period 
one of great opportunity, during which individuals may be especially good candidates for 
rehabilitative interventions. On the negative side, however, the same plasticity that makes the 
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brain susceptible to positive influence makes it vulnerable to toxic experiences. Thus, research 
has shown that adolescence is a time when individuals are particularly vulnerable to addiction, 
especially responsive to stress, and more likely than at any other time to experience serious 
mental health problems.
161
 One important implication of this is that residential and correctional 
facilities in which adolescents are placed are likely to have a profound impact on juveniles’ 
psychological functioning and development. Harmful correctional experiences, such as exposure 
to violence or social isolation, are likely to be particularly damaging at this stage of life. 
Finally, just as there is a significant increase in plasticity early in adolescence, there is a 
corresponding decrease during the transition from adolescence to adulthood. The fact that the 
brain becomes less plastic as individuals mature out of adolescence is now well-established 
although the mechanisms that trigger this loss of plasticity have yet to be identified. Nonetheless, 
it is likely that adolescence represents an especially formative period in brain development, and 
that major changes in the brain become increasingly intractable with age. This creates special 
urgency to intervene during this period to promote positive psychological functioning. 
This research underscores the important impact of juvenile correctional programs on 
individual development during a critical developmental stage. Thinking about correctional 
settings as social contexts for development during a period in which individuals are highly 
sensitive and responsive to that context provides a critical perspective from which to evaluate 
justice system facilities and programs. As we saw in Part II, negative conditions (or the absence 
of positive conditions) in the adolescent’s social context can contribute to harmful risk-taking. 
Neglectful parents, antisocial peers, and schools and neighborhoods devoid of productive, 
engaging activities contribute to juveniles’ involvement in crime. Some correctional settings are 
also likely to have a very negative impact. The social-context framework clarifies why prisons 
are widely viewed as toxic developmental settings.
162
  The likelihood that the juvenile inmate 
will establish a relationship with an authoritative adult is negligible. Relationships between 
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guards and prisoners typically are hostile and distant, and adult inmates are unlikely to care for 
and provide positive adult guidance to juvenile prisoners.
163
 The juvenile inmate is surrounded 
by antisocial peers and adults, and often has a great deal of unstructured time in their 
company.
164
 Educational and vocational programs in prison often are deficient and few are 
tailored to the needs of adolescents. Not surprisingly, juveniles sentenced to prison have high 
recidivism rates.  
This analysis clarifies that even though much juvenile offending is the product of the 
interaction of immature adolescents and a social context that promotes risk-taking, maturation 
and desistence are not inevitable. Given heightened brain plasticity during adolescence, social 
context plays a key role in whether juveniles successfully accomplish the developmental tasks 
necessary to make the transition to productive adulthood, and it can undermine as well as 
facilitate progress. Thus the correctional setting in which the juvenile is sanctioned can play an 
important role in determining the trajectory of the adolescent offender’s future life.165 Programs 
that aim to facilitate desistence in juvenile offenders and encourage their transition to productive 
adulthood will attend to the impact of the developing offender’s social context and seek to 
provide the conditions for healthy development.  
IV. Legal Implications of the Interactive Framework. 
In this Part we explore the importance of the interactive framework that we have 
developed in this article for legal doctrine and policy aimed at sanctioning juveniles for their 
crimes and deterring juvenile crime. First, the framework powerfully reinforces constitutional 
principles under which juvenile offenders generally are deemed less culpable than adults, and 
more likely to desist from offending as they mature into adulthood. These principles, in turn, 
support a broad range of justice policies premised on juveniles’ reduced culpability and greater 
potential for reform. Our analysis of the interaction between the individual youth and his or her 
social context provides an effective response to the skeptics who reject the importance of 
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immaturity as a mitigating factor in criminal liability on the ground that many adolescents do not 
engage in criminal conduct. Second, our interactive framework clarifies the importance of social 
context as a legitimate, but limited, contributor to a theory of mitigation, and as such it offers a 
useful intervention in a longstanding debate among criminal law scholars.
166
  Social context, we 
have shown, has a far narrower, but more direct, impact on adolescents’ criminal choices than 
was recognized by advocates arguing genertally that a defendant’s “severe environmental 
deprivation rotten social background’ (SED) reduces culpability.167 Finally, we highlight the 
policy importance of social context in developing sanctions for juveniles that are likely to 
promote, and not undermine, healthy maturation and desistence from crime. In general, focusing 
on the interaction between adolescents and their social context provides a more complete account 
of juvenile offending and desistence than a model that emphasizes only the immaturity of 
teenage brains. 
A. Reduced Culpability and Potential for Reform  
The Supreme Court in its juvenile sentencing opinions announced that “Children are 
different,” and cited studies of brain development in concluding that harsh criminal sentences 
that might be appropriate for some adult offenders are unconstitutional for juveniles under the 8
th
 
Amendment.
168
 The Court focused primarily on how the immaturity of adolescents can lead them 
to make impulsive, reckless decisions and engage in “heedless risk-taking;”169 it also observed 
that, because their crimes are the product of immaturity, most juvenile offenders will reform as 
they mature into adulthood and should be given the opportunity to do so.170 Culpability skeptics 
have challenged this analysis, pointing to the very serious crimes committed by the juvenile 
petitioners in the cases before the Court, and observing that few adolescents commit similar 
crimes.
171
  
It is not our purpose to analyze whether Chris Simmons (who killed a neighbor, bound 
her, and threw her in a nearby river) was driven by factors associated with adolescent immaturity 
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or by largely endogenous influences.
172
 Instead, we propose that our interactive framework 
provides important confirmation of the Supreme Court’s “children are different” principle and 
shows that the skeptics’ critique targets a narrow and empirically incomplete version of the 
Court’s mitigation analysis. Indeed, the Court in its sentencing opinions underscored the 
importance of social context and adolescents’ normative sensitivity to that context as a key 
feature of juvenile offenders’ reduced culpability.  In Miller, the Court stated that juveniles are 
“constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing, in part because they are more 
vulnerable …to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their family and 
peers;” they have "limited control over their own environment,” and “lack the ability to extricate 
themselves from horrific crime-producing settings.”173 In these words, the Court succinctly 
summarized its understanding that important dimensions of the reduced culpability of juveniles 
and of their potential for reform are both their extreme sensitivity to social context (an 
endogenous developmental factor), and that social context itself (an exogenous influence). 
Neither of these contributors to juvenile offending is substantially within the control of the 
juvenile. 
This point deserves elaboration. Adolescents’ sensitivity to social context, and 
particularly to emotional arousal in the presence of peers, is endogenous, associated with 
development of the social brain after puberty. The adolescent’s control over this aspect of 
development is no greater than her control over other aspects of brain development, including the 
inclination toward reward seeking or the tendency to make impulsive choices when aroused. To 
the extent that normative developmental immaturity mitigates juveniles’ criminal culpability, 
susceptibility to peer influence and sensitivity to social context are as salient as other endogenous 
influences on decision-making. Further, like the teenager’s inclination toward reward-seeking, 
susceptibility to peer influence declines with maturation. It is one dimension of developmental 
change that support the Supreme Court’s conclusion that juvenile offenders have a greater 
potential for reform than their adult counterparts. In short, the endogenous features of brain 
development that make adolescents particularly sensitive to social context function as do other 
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aspects of social-emotional brain development to distinguish juvenile offenders from adults. In 
combination, these features play a key role in criminal choices and support greater leniency 
toward juvenile offenders. 
The Supreme Court also recognizes that juveniles often have little control over their 
social context and usually no ability to extricate themselves from a setting that facilitates 
criminal activity.
174
 Children and adolescents do not choose their parents, neighborhoods, 
schools and communities. Parents may be neglectful and provide little supervision; the 
neighborhood and school may be dangerous, with little positive structure and few prosocial 
activities; and available peers may be inclined toward antisocial behavior. These conditions, as 
Part II explained, create a social context that facilitates youthful involvement in criminal activity. 
But, as legal minors, teenagers living with these conditions are not free to move to a new 
neighborhood, enter a new school, or (usually) find prosocial peers with whom to associate. The 
upshot is that most youths have little ability to control or change a social context that may 
contribute to their offending. The Supreme Court, in finding social context itself to contribute to 
juveniles’ reduced culpability, in effect recognizes its importance in facilitating teenage criminal 
behavior.  
As skeptics of mitigation based on immaturity observe, endogenous developmental 
factors alone provide an inadequate basis for treating young offenders as a special category, 
because many adolescents do not commit serious crimes.  Some critics of the recent science-
based trend see juveniles as indistinguishable from adults when it comes to criminal liability,
175
 
apparently viewing antisocial behavior generally as motivated by the individual’s deficient 
character. The Supreme Court, however, recognized that juveniles deserve more lenient 
treatment than adults, not only because of developmental traits and tendencies, but also because 
their social context, over which they have little control, impels them to offend.  The interactive 
framework that we have offered strongly supports and elucidates the Court’s position. 
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The Supreme Court’s analysis draws on two conventional sources of mitigation under 
criminal law doctrine.
176
  Mitigation applies to criminal acts that reflect diminished decision-
making capacity; like mental illness or intellectual disability, immaturity can be the source of 
deficiencies in decision-making. As we have explained, social and emotional factors associated 
with adolescent brain development can undermine teenagers’ capacity for rational decision-
making under some conditions. Mitigation also applies to acts that respond to exogenous 
coercive pressures; indeed, the defense of duress is based on the intuition that a defendant who 
offends under truly extraordinary pressure is not culpable at all. As our interactive model 
demonstrates, these sources of mitigation are uniquely interwoven in adolescent criminal 
choices.  Normative endogenous vulnerabilities make teenagers particularly susceptible to 
exogenous pressures from which they may be unable to escape, leading to impulsive, short-
sighted choices.  
Our interactive framework also provides strong support for the Court’s conclusion that 
adolescents should receive less punishment than adult counterparts due to their potential for 
reform. The biologically-based tendencies that contribute to juvenile offending change and 
diminish as adolescents mature into adulthood, reducing their inclination to engage in reward-
seeking and make impulsive choices in response to social context. At the same time, key 
elements of the social context also change, as peers themselves mature and become less inclined 
to encourage risky peer group behavior. Unless the trajectory of normal development is derailed, 
individuals predictably will make the transition to non-criminal adulthood as they mature.   
The developmental framework elucidated by the court in the juvenile sentencing opinions 
dealt only with the most severe criminal sanctions and affected a small category of young 
offenders. But, as courts, legislatures and policymakers have recognized, the “children are 
different” principle applies broadly to the justice system’s treatment of young offenders. Courts 
have cited Miller and other Supreme Court opinions in decisions that have prohibited the use of 
sentences imposed on juveniles under adult enhanced sentencing schemes,
177
 and have excluded 
juvenile sex offenders from sex offender registries.
178
 A few courts have prohibited the use of 
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any mandatory minimum sentence for a juvenile.
179
 Legislatures also have adopted the court’s 
developmental principles in creating special parole regulations for juvenile offenders.
180
 In recent 
years, states regulators as well have embraced developmental principles in responding to juvenile 
crime, implementing policies that recognize the unique attributes of young offenders and aim to 
shape their development to adulthood in a positive direction.
181
 The upshot is that our interactive 
framework, in clarifying the interaction between the developing adolescent brain and social 
context, reinforces the developmental approach to juvenile crime that has emerged sin the past 
decade.  
B. “Severe Environmental Deprivation” Revisited 
In the 1970s and 1980s, criminal law scholars and judges debated whether a defendant’s 
impoverished background served to mitigate criminal responsibility.
182
 Some scholars argued 
that offenders who have experienced severe socio-economic deprivation are less culpable than 
other offenders and deserve less (or no) punishment, because deprivation excuses or mitigates 
criminal responsibility. Other scholars have argued against this position, on the ground that an 
offender’s impoverished background is simply not the kind of condition that reduces liability 
under conventional criminal law principles.  
Richard Delgado, the leading proponent of the severe environmental deprivation (SED) 
defense, points to the reality that a large percentage of offenders come from deprived social 
backgrounds. On the basis of this correlation, he posits that poverty causes some individuals to 
commit crimes.
183
 On Delgado’s view, SED can constrain the criminal actor’s free choice as 
effectively as conventional sources of exculpation and therefore can be accommodated within 
criminal law doctrine. Delgado describes aspects of living in poverty that contribute to stress and 
anger in individuals; these environmental influences include inadequate schools, unemployment, 
substandard housing and other living conditions and a social context that contributes to an 
“alternative value system.”184  He argues that these factors in combination could seriously 
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undermine behavioral controls, leading the individual to engage in criminal conduct. On 
Delgado’s view, the inclination to commit crime is a pathology caused by poverty.185 
Other scholars have rejected the argument that economic deprivation is relevant to excuse 
or mitigation for criminal conduct.
186
 Stephen Morse has pointed out that causation is a 
capacious concept and that behavior, including criminal acts, can be traced to many causal 
factors. On Morse’s view, even if poverty contributes to offending in a causal sense, that alone is 
insufficient to diminish an offender’s criminal liability because deprivation does not impede the 
individual’s capacity for rational reflection in making choices in a way that affects criminal 
responsibility. Nor does the experience of living in poverty create an irresistible compulsion to 
offend, or make the actor facing a “hard choice” (perhaps made harder by conditions of 
deprivation) unable to choose not to engage in criminal conduct.
187
  Thus, offenders who have 
experienced economic deprivation simply cannot legitimately claim a defense based on 
conventional exculpatory principles of criminal law.  
While SED has interested scholars and advocates, and is sometimes described in passing 
in treatises, 
188
 it has had little impact on the law.
189
 As Delgado acknowledged in 2011, no state 
has adopted a defense of extreme economic deprivation.
190
 This is not surprising, perhaps. For 
both conceptual and practical reasons, SED is a hard sell. Courts may fear that applying and 
limiting the defense would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible. With its broad 
conception of causation and capacious view of mitigating constraints on free choice, the SED 
defense would transform criminal litigation. A large percentage of defendants could plausibly 
claim that their crimes were mitigated or excused by the deprivation they experienced. Thus on 
purely pragmatic grounds, lawmakers have been unwilling to open a Pandora’s box by adopting 
a defense that would also undermine the basic principles of criminal responsibility.
191
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The argument for a defense based on severe economic deprivation is far more capacious 
than our claim that social context interacts with endogenous features of adolescence in ways that 
can the decision making of young offenders.  The interactive framework we describe focuses on 
the peculiar vulnerability to environmental stimuli of individuals during a discreet stage that is 
part of normal development; moreover the environmental stimuli that impact criminal choices in 
our framework are limited to those that influence adolescents because of endogenous 
vulnerabilities associated with this stage. Thus the developmental framework is self-limiting. In 
contrast, the harm of severe economic deprivation, on Delgado’s view, may begin in childhood 
and adolescence, but its impact and relevance to criminal responsibility can extend to any adult 
criminal who has suffered the effects of deprivation. Moreover, the sources of the harm that can 
impact individual criminal behavior include many aspects of life in an impoverished community, 
from deficient parenting to physical conditions such as substandard housing to unemployment. 
Further, Delgado views the inclination to offend as a pathology caused by poverty, not as a 
response characteristic of a normative developmental stage.
192
  
The importance of social context under our framework is specific and limited. Peers and 
other aspects of the adolescent’s social environment stimulate normal biological tendencies 
toward reward seeking and impulsivity in ways that undermine the youth’s capacity for rational 
choice and deliberation. These developmental influences do not excuse the youth from criminal 
responsibility; the interaction does not deprive the youth altogether of the capacity for rational 
reflection or result in irresistible compulsion. But a normative adolescent capable of making a 
rational decision under neutral conditions predictably will act impulsively and with little 
consideration of future consequences when associating with risk-inclined peers. Also 
predictably, most youths will outgrow this tendency to engage in risky activity. As the Supreme 
Court clarified, adolescent immaturity is relevant to the law’s response to juvenile crime for two 
reasons: First, teenage decision making is impaired due to developmentally-linked influences 
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and, second, most juvenile offenders will mature out of their antisocial inclinations; their 
welfare, as well as social welfare, will be enhanced if the legal response to their offending offers 
the opportunity to do so.  
To be sure, many adolescents who get involved in criminal activity live under conditions 
of socio-economic deprivation. But only those aspects of the social context that interact directly 
with the developing brains of adolescents are relevant to our analysis and only to the extent that 
these factors contribute directly to normative risk-taking by encouraging reward-seeking and 
impulsivity. Thus, physical conditions and many environmental influences that likely influence 
the life trajectories of youth living in poverty are excluded from our analysis, although they may 
indeed contribute to criminal behavior. This is not to say that lawmakers should ignore the 
impact of economic deprivation,
193
 but only to clarify that the argument for criminal mitigation 
on this ground is far broader than the one we are making.  
C. Correctional Policy in an Interactive Framework.   
Part III explained that correctional programs constitute social contexts for young 
offenders and that their interactions with correctional settings can shape the trajectories of their 
future lives. Criminal sanctions that fail to offer conditions important for the accomplishment of 
essential developmental tasks can undermine the adolescent’s maturation to productive 
adulthood. But correctional programs that embrace the developmental lessons that we have 
described can maximize the likelihood that the juvenile offender will mature out of his 
inclination to get involved in criminal activity. Correctional settings that incorporate  
developmental knowledge help the juvenile to make a successful transition to adulthood by 
assisting him to acquire the skills and tools needed to assume the adult work and family roles.   
Successful correctional programs and facilities will recognize the importance of social 
context to healthy adolescent development.
194
 Effective interventions aim to provide an antidote 
to the environmental influences that encouraged antisocial behavior by incorporating into 
correctional programs the three conditions needed to facilitate social development.
195
 As Part III 
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explained, these included an authoritative parent or other adult invested in the youth’s welfare to 
provide support and guidance,
196
 association with pro-social peers (and limited exposure to 
antisocial peers),
197
 and meaningful activities to assist the adolescent to acquire skills needed for 
adult roles and to develop autonomy.
198
 We each dimension in turn:   
First, policies grounded in the interactive framework aim to foster the relationship 
between the young offender and one or more authoritative adults. Ideally, this can be 
accomplished by assisting parents to adequately fulfill their role. The most successful 
community-based correctional programs aim, as a core goal, to enable parents of young 
offenders to function more competently in their role.
199
 These programs teach parents the 
importance of engagement, supervision and guidance of adolescents as keys to effective 
parenting and seek to give them the tools to function as authoritative parents. The importance of 
involving parents in juvenile correctional programs and teaching them to fulfill their critically 
important role in their children’s lives has led experts to insist that residential correctional 
facilities be close enough to the juvenile’s home that parents can participate in rehabilitation 
programs.
200
 If parents are unable or unwilling to participate meaningfully in a program aimed at 
developing their competency, or if their child cannot accept them, another caring adult can serve 
as a substitute, providing guidance and mentorship.
201
  This adult may be a correctional 
professional or therapist, or it may be a teacher, coach or social worker with whom the juvenile 
has, or can develop, a close relationship.  
Second, a healthy correctional setting limits the influence of antisocial peers and 
facilitates engagement with pro-social peers. This presents a challenge in residential programs 
for juvenile offenders since, by definition, the peer group consists of youths who have 
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demonstrated an inclination to engage in antisocial behavior.  One implication of the 
developmental analysis is that residential programs should be small and create a structured 
environment. The residential delinquency programs thought to be most effective follow some 
version of what has been called the Missouri model, which is based on small facilities near 
juvenile offenders’ homes (to facilitate parental involvement); the program provides structure 
and adult supervision and limits casual peer contact. For juveniles in community correctional 
programs, the antisocial peer group represents a serious temptation to return to involvement in 
criminal activity. Programs that effectively reduce recidivism aim to provide tools that will assist 
the youth in resisting antisocial peer influence and to facilitate connection with prosocial 
peers.
202
 Because integration (or reintegration) of the juvenile offender into prosocial peer groups 
is so important, a school district policy that segregates or excludes former offenders is 
problematic as it will likely isolate youths from prosocial influences.
203
 Community programs 
that encourage offenders’ involvement in sports and other mainstream peer activities potentially 
can deter association with antisocial peers and promote healthy peer relationships.  
Finally programs that assist young offenders to develop social, educational and 
vocational skills and to learn to make decisions independently and engage in critical thinking 
prepare them for adult lives. Youths in the community can participate in mainstream educational 
programs and programs that assist them to prepare for work roles, under the supervision of 
correctional professionals who can provide support, encourage compliance with requirements 
and insist on completion.
204
 Providing meaningful programming is more difficult in a residential 
setting, but some states have adopted educational and skill building programs in residential 
facilities that aim to prepare juvenile offenders for adult life. 
Our analysis of the importance of the correctional setting in achieving the law’s goal of 
minimizing recidivism and facilitating healthy maturation has an important general policy 
implication. Large institutions historically have dominated the juvenile correctional systems in 
many states; our analysis indicates that these facilities are impoverished social contexts that lack 
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the conditions that promote healthy development.
205
 Typically these institutions are in rural 
settings far from young offenders’ (urban) homes, and thus do not readily accommodate 
involvement of parents in delinquency programs. Staff in large institutions necessarily act as 
custodians and guards; the setting does not lend itself to the kind of relationship between 
authoritative adult and adolescent that meets developmental needs.
206
 Beyond this, juvenile 
institutions house large numbers of offenders and generally lack the capacity to supervise the 
residents, exacerbating the influence of antisocial peers on one another. Moreover, rival factions 
that threaten one another are more likely to develop in an impersonal setting in which teenagers 
do not know all of the other residents. And finally, large institutions seldom provide the 
customized educational and skill-building programs needed to prepare juveniles for adult life.
207
 
It is not surprising that as part of the recent reform movement in juvenile justice, many states 
have closed large institutions and shifted resources to community-based programs.
208
  An 
important report by the National Academy of Science strongly recommends closing juvenile 
correctional institutions. The report explains that if residential placement is needed for the safety 
of the community or the juvenile, small facilities near the offenders’ homes are likely to provide 
far better developmental settings.
209
 
In general, reformers have favored community-based correctional programs, although 
few have focused explicitly on how these programs can provide a social context for healthy 
development more effectively than a residential program.
210
 The view that community programs 
are superior to residential facilities may seem counterintuitive, in that the social context of the 
juvenile’s peers, family and neighborhood likely contributed to his criminal activity. But a 
community-based correctional program can assist the juvenile to navigate these social contexts 
and prepare for adult life in the community by focusing directly on the conditions for healthy 
development. This kind of program can involve parents in the juvenile’s treatment more readily 
than a residential placement. Programs can also facilitate association with prosocial peers and 
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engage the juvenile to participate in meaningful activities that prepare him for adult life. The 
premise of Multi-systemic Therapy, among the most successful correctional programs in 
reducing recidivism in juveniles, is that the therapist engages with the juvenile in all of the 
youth’s social contexts--family, peers, school and neighborhood.211 This program assists parents 
to function more capably and provides juveniles with the tools to avoid antisocial peers and to 
affiliate with pro-social peers. 
212
To be sure, community-based programs face the challenge of 
assisting delinquent youths to avoid the temptation of rejoining their antisocial peer groups. But 
this temptation will exist when the juvenile is released from residential placement, and 
community-based programs confront the challenge head-on.  
Conclusion 
Contemporary lawmakers increasingly have recognized the critical importance of 
adolescent brain development in formulating policies that respond to juvenile crime. Attention 
has focused primarily on how endogenous biological and psychological factors undermine 
teenage decision making and contribute to involvement in criminal activity. This article broadens 
the lens to provide a more comprehensive picture, examining the interaction between the 
immature adolescent and his or her social context. Our interactive framework clarifies that 
youthful offending, like adolescent risk-taking generally, is a product of a dynamic relationship 
between the teenager and her environment. Our analysis of the unique salience of social context 
during this developmental period provides more robust supports for arguments for mitigation 
than claims based narrowly on biological and psychological immaturity. It also provides 
powerful evidence that correctional programs providing young offenders with healthy 
developmental contexts are more likely to realize the law’s goal of crime reduction than 
sanctions that ignore the importance of social environment.  
                                                 
211
 Henggeler, Melton, & Smith, supra note 180; Scott Henggeler et al., Family Preservation Using Multisystemic 
Treatment: Long-Term Follow-up to a Clinical Trial with Serious Juvenile Offenders, 2 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 283 
(1993); Mark Lipsey, What Do We Learn from 400 Research Studies on the Effectiveness of Treatment with Juvenile 
Delinquents?, in WHAT WORKS? REDUCING REOFFENDING (James McGuire, ed., 1995). 
212
 Peter Greenwood, CHANGING LIVES: DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AS CRIME-CONTROL POLICY (2006). 
 
